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ABSTRACT
There are a number of stylised facts relating to cyclical developments in
money and credit aggregates and in interest rates since the start of the new
millennium in all the major advanced regions of the world, including the
euro area, that are puzzling. There would seem to be a new aspect to the
way money has behaved in recent times, namely the acceleration in the
growth rate of the money stock that occurred when one would have
expected the opposite, i.e., a slowing down in response to the weaker
growth as in the US (in the early years of the new millennium) and the
slowing growth rate in the euro area (approximately over the same time
period). This paper discusses these puzzles in monetary dynamics and
proposes some possible explanations, primarily the democratisation of
financial markets and sounder money. Furthermore, we discuss the role of
uncertainty in money demand and chart its influence on monetary
developments in the euro area. We conclude that there is a risk that the
traditional effects of rapid growth in money and credit aggregates and low
interest rates are merely being postponed and will show up later in an
acceleration in the pace of aggregate demand which will not be matched
by a corresponding increase in the capacity of the economy to supply
goods and services and may therefore translate into accelerating inflation.
1. Introduction
There are a number of stylised facts relating to cyclical
developments in money and credit aggregates and in interest
rates since the start of the new millennium in all the major
advanced regions of the world, including the euro area, that are
puzzling. Even in broad contour terms, they do not seem to
conform to the patterns experienced over previous business
cycles.
There would seem to be a new aspect to the way money has
behaved in recent times. This is the acceleration in the growth
rate of the money stock that occurred when one would have
expected the opposite, i.e., a slowing down in response to the
weaker growth rate as in the US (in the early years of the new
millennium) and the slowing growth rate in the euro area
(approximately over the same time period). As pointed out in the
ECB Monthly Bulletin for January 2004
1, this unusual behaviour
of money would appear to have occurred globally. A slowing
money growth rate has been invariably what happened at the
onset of all previous cyclical downturns in the US at least since
the 1950s. This would seem to indicate prima facie that the
relationship between money and income is departing from what
current orthodoxy in monetary theory predicts.
* The authors are Head and Economist, respectively, in the Monetary Policy & Financial
Stability Department. The views expressed in this article are the personal responsibility of
the authors and are not necessarily those held by the CBFSAI or the ESCB. The authors
would like to thank Rafique Mottiar and Tom O’Connell for helpful comments.
1 See Box 1 entitled ‘‘Worldwide Trends in Monetary Aggregates Over Recent Years’’, ECB
Monthly Bulletin, January 2004.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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The paper first looks at these puzzles. It focuses on the stylised
facts using graphical analysis only. It proposes an explanation
for the puzzling behaviour. It argues that it lies in the growing
importance of financial markets over the last two to three
decades along with developments in banking. These have led to
growing retail participation in financial markets and to sounder
money and have, arguably, given rise to new and possibly
dangerously destabilising movements into, and out of, money.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 of the paper details
and addresses the puzzling stylised facts and attempts to address
the question as to why behaviour in relation to a number of
money, credit and interest rate variables in recent times differs
so radically from behaviour during similar cyclical episodes in the
past. Section 3 addresses money and uncertainty and discusses
briefly buffer stock money. This is the idea that money serves as
a store of value across time giving it an important role as a buffer
against shocks. This section also looks at the role for measures
of uncertainty in money demand functions. Section 4 discusses
shocks, uncertainty and money demand and supply whilst
reviewing some of the developments that have taken place that
may be having an impact on the recent puzzling monetary
dynamics, such as growing household participation in financial
markets facilitated by financial innovation and sounder money.
Section 5 of the paper discusses money and interest rate
dynamics and the time-varying motives for holding money and
the consequences for interest rates in this new setting. The
varying roles of the three classical motives for holding money
(i.e., the transactions, the precautionary and the speculative
motives) in a context in which uncertainty seems to move in
cycles are key to understanding recent developments. Section 6
discusses money disequilibrium resolution while Section 7
attempts to use this same conceptual framework to account for
money and credit developments in the euro area since the start
of monetary union by examining money’s components and
counterparts. Section 8 offers some tentative conclusions.
2. Puzzling Behaviour
The first puzzling aspect of behaviour is that, at least since the
1960s, money and credit aggregates have never grown so fast,
or so persistently, as they have since the turn of the millennium
without having a substantial impact on inflation. Secondly, there
has never been an interval of time in this period in which the real
rate of interest has been so low for so long in emerging from a
recession (US) or, in the case of the euro area, a growth
slowdown (see Charts 1 and 2) without also having some
adverse effect on inflation
2.
2 The vertical lines in Charts 1 to 4 inclusive represent the full recession period (irrespective
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Chart 1: US Real Fed Funds Rate through Business Cycles
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Chart 3: US Money Stock Growth and the US Business Cycles
Source: FRED II and authors' calculations.
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Chart 4: US M2 Money Stock Growth and Business Cycle Averages
Source: FRED II and authors' calculations.
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Thirdly, never, over roughly this same time span, has money
stock growth accelerated going into, and during, a recession as
it did before and during the 2001 recession in the US (see Charts
3 and 4). The euro area equivalent to this behaviour has been
a sharp acceleration in money stock growth during its growth
slowdown (but not a recession) in the early years of the new
millennium (see Chart 5). In Japan in the latter half of the 1990s,
amid concern over heightened credit risks and a deteriorating
domestic Japanese economy, the pattern was again qualitatively
similar. The growth rate of the money stock accelerated as the
economic situation deteriorated. Kimura (2001), in reviewing
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Chart 5: Euro Area M3 and Real GDP Annual Percentage Change
Source: ECB.
Fourthly, never have official interest rates been raised by so much
within such a short space of time (in the US Fed’s recent
tightening phase) with so little effect on long rates (see Chart 6
related to the Greenspan ‘conundrum’) and with apparently such
little effect on the pace of activity in the real economy (see Chart
7). Since 1990, three distinct tightening cycles can be identified
in Chart 6, namely those starting in early 1994, in mid-1999 and
in April of 2004. The increase in the short rate from the trough
to the next peak in the first of these was 319 basis points while
the long rate increased by 233 basis points over the same time
span, giving an elasticity of the long to the short rate of 0.55
3.
The corresponding figure for the second tightening episode is
0.54. In the tightening cycle that began in April of 2004, the short
rate increased by 433 basis points to the next peak in July 2006
while the long rate increased by only 133 basis points over the
same period. This corresponds to an elasticity of 0.22, half of the
elasticities of the previous two tightenings. A similar puzzle may
3 Taking the levels for the rates of the average of starting and ending points.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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be emerging in the euro area (see Chart 8) but, as yet, it is too
early to say. The matching elasticities to those just noted for the
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Chart 6: US Short- and Long-term Interest Rates



































































Chart 7: Effective Federal Funds Rate and NBER Recession Periods
Source: FRED II and NBER.
%
Against the benchmark of past cyclical experience, these are all
puzzles. But they are puzzles, which, we argue, are all closely
interrelated with one another. We argue, furthermore, that they
may all be resolved in the light of at most one or two behavioural
changes that have occurred, for the most part, over the last few
decades. A similar story line may therefore be capable of
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Chart 8: Euro Area Short- and Long-term Interest Rates
Source: ECB and authors' calculations.
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Since rapid money and credit growth and low interest rates are
exactly the kind of conditions that produced accelerating
inflation in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is curious why these
same conditions do not now seem to be having anything like
similar adverse effects. Prima facie, there seems to have been
some change in monetary dynamics. The corollary of loose
monetary policy producing accelerating inflation is tight
monetary policy producing a recession. According to the
colourful description of Dornbusch (1997), all previous
economic recoveries in the US were ‘‘murdered in bed’’ by
central bank tightening. So it is now puzzling why the current
round of unprecedented sharp Fed tightening is not apparently,
to date at any rate, having any kind of comparable effect (as
noted already in Charts 6 and 7). Is the apparent failure of the
recent episodes of very loose monetary policy in the US, the
euro area and especially Japan, to produce accelerating inflation
related, in some way, to the corollary puzzle of the apparent
failure of tight monetary policy (at least in the US
4) to rein in
aggregate demand? More generally, has there been some
structural change in these economies that is attenuating the
effect of the monetary policy stance on the pace of economic
activity and inflation? Can we identify what is the nature of this
structural change, if any? These are some of the questions we
will be attempting to address in this paper.
It is worth bearing in mind that, at least according to one fairly
widely-accepted theory, much of the inflation of the 1970s was
attributed to a misunderstanding among policymakers about
4 At time of writing, the ECB had not completed its tightening phase and the Bank of Japan
had only increased rates moderately from a level of zero.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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supply shocks and their effects on the natural rate of
unemployment
5. The question therefore naturally arises as to
whether there could be a similar misunderstanding among
policymakers occurring now but in relation to a different area of
the economy. Perhaps there has been a structural shift underlying
some of the economic processes relevant to monetary policy,
which we don’t yet fully understand.
The objective of this paper is to suggest one possible explanation
for these puzzling developments. It lies in a combination of
developments in financial markets (and their globalisation), in
developments in the banking industry and in the increasing
soundness of money as a store of value, all occurring in a context
of shocks that are increasingly global in nature hitting the world
economy. These shocks occasionally occur in clusters as in the
early years of the new millennium.
There may be implications from the behaviour flagged here for
the future pace of economic activity (relative to potential) and
consequently for inflation. These implications may be less benign
than the current consensus forecasts are implying. This is
because the effect of these putative structural changes may be
merely to delay the full impact of money, credit and interest rate
developments on activity and inflation and not to undermine the
long-run money-inflation relationship which is probably the most
well documented relationship in economics and which has
existed for centuries.
If this is correct, then some of the current conventional thinking
— that the failure of rapid money growth to translate into inflation
acceleration reflects the growing irrelevance of money — could
lead to false and dangerous conclusions about the true stance of
monetary policy. Our inferences from the stylised facts here are
at best tentative, but it could be the case that all that has changed
is the short- to medium-term money-inflation dynamics and not
the long-run underlying relationship.
What is undeniable from all past data internationally is that the
long-run relationship between money and inflation is very tight.
Over the 30-year horizon 1968 to 1998, the correlation
coefficient between the monetary base, on the one hand, and
inflation on the other across a sample of 116 countries was 0.99.
Equally impressive is the lack of any long-run relationship
between either narrow or broad money on the one hand and
output on the other with respective coefficients of -0.09 and -
0.08
6. Equally impressive is the remarkably strong and stable
relationship between money growth and inflation over widely
different monetary regimes and time periods going back into the
19
th century (for example, see Stark (2007)). Not only is this
5 See Orphanides (2001).
6 Figures quoted in King (2001), then deputy governor, now governor, of the Bank of England.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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relationship strong, it shows a consistent lead of money growth
over inflation. It holds for all definitions of money and is clearly
independent of monetary policy regime since it pertains to very
long time periods. For the euro area, it shows that long-run
money growth bottomed out just before 2000 and that inflation
started to pick up about two years later. A worrying feature is
the fact that the level of money that, according to these
correlations, drives inflation is already outstanding in the euro
area. It cannot now be easily reined in. For the most part, all that
the central bank can do, and indeed all it typically aspires to do,
through tighter monetary policy, is to reduce the flow supply of
new liquidity to the banking system — it rarely aims to reduce
the outstanding stock.
Two things are clear therefore. There has undoubtedly been
some kind of shift in short-run monetary dynamics as the above
puzzles indicate. To the extent that we can make some
inferences about this, it seems that this shift has affected the
dynamic interaction between money demand and supply in the
new financial market setting that has emerged in the last few
decades of the past century. However, if there has been no
change in the long-run money-inflation dynamics, central banks
are now running serious risks that inflation will accelerate beyond
the levels consistent with the typical definitions of price stability.
3. Money and Uncertainty
3.1 Buffer Stock Money — Rationale
It is our belief that the theory of money demand that comes
closest to throwing light on the puzzling developments in
monetary aggregates since the turn of the millennium is the
buffer stock approach to money demand. There is an old
literature on the buffer stock demand for money, which
flourished between the mid-1970s and the end of the 1980s.
The micro-foundations for the buffer stock money demand were
derived by Miller and Orr (1966) and Akerlof (1973,1979). Other
seminal contributions were made by Goodhart (1984), Laidler
(1984), Milbourne (1987,1988), Cuthbertson and Taylor (1988,
1989, inter alia) and Davidson and Ireland (1987,1988). Tests of
the theory can be found in Carr and Darby (1981) and Browne
(1989).
According to this literature, there are a few different rationales
for the demand for money as a buffer. The mainstream view is
that money is more convenient to adjust in the face of shocks
than are financial asset holdings. This money adjustment
compensates for financial assets adjustment in periods of
turbulence in financial markets. Money tends to be held as a
temporary abode of purchasing power until other assets can be
adjusted in response to economic and financial market
developments. From the point of view of the individual, theQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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money supply is exogenous. Changes in this exogenous supply
can result in individuals holding more money balances than they
would otherwise hold if they were at their long-run desired
money holdings. An apparent instability of money demand when
none exists can be rationalised by the buffer stock theory of
money demand.
An alternative rationale for holding buffers of money is based on
a combination of search theory and irreversible investment
theory (see Mizen (1994) for a more in-depth discussion).
Individuals may not wish to incur the costs of making a rash
portfolio investment decision, which might be very expensive to
reverse. They therefore hold idle money balance while searching
for attractive investment opportunities.
Much of the theorising is convincing and the empirical results
compelling. However, as these references indicate, this strand of
the monetary literature goes back some distance in time, but,
arguably, the kind of behaviour highlighted by these models is
now much more relevant than it was in the past when it was
widely seen as making an important contribution to monetary
thinking. This is because financial markets have flourished and
deepened in the meantime. Household participation in these
expanded financial markets has also spread rapidly. While a
shock to the financial system would have created a ripple effect
in the 1970s or 1980s, in the 2000s this is more likely to have
become a tsunami.
The argument for a buffer stock role for money is now even
stronger than it was when these theories were attracting the
close attention of the profession. But, largely because of these
very developments, the rationale for a buffer stock role for
money is now not only stronger but also different in important
ways from that propounded in this literature. A recent strand of
research has focused on looking at the effects of uncertainty on
money demand. In the next sub-section we look at these briefly,
inter alia.
3.2 Incorporating Uncertainty and ‘Cheap Leverage’ Seriatim
in Money Demand
Typically, money demand functions include two main sets of
explanatory variables, namely a scale variable and a measure of
opportunity cost. The scale variable generally takes the form of
real GDP while the measure of opportunity cost is open to some
variation. Many of such measures take the form of the spread
between a long- and short-term interest rates. However, other
models, such as that in Calza et al (2001) create a measure of
opportunity cost using the spread between a short-term interest
rate and a constructed measure of the own rate of return on the
euro area M3 monetary aggregate.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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A growing school of thought advocates the inclusion of another
variable in the model, i.e., one to capture the effects of
uncertainty (see, inter alia, Greiber and Lemke (2005),
Carstensen (2003 and 2006) and Alves et. al. (2006)). However,
an almost insurmountable problem in examining issues relating
to money and uncertainty arises from the fact that the
uncertainty in question (technically known as Knightian
uncertainty) is, by definition, not easily susceptible to
measurement. Knight (1921) originally made the distinction
between ‘uncertainty’ and ‘risk’. When one is faced with a
situation in which there are a number of alternative outcomes, it
is either a situation of ‘uncertainty’ or one of ‘risk’. If there is
sufficient experience of similar situations in which decisions had
to be taken in the past, then the probabilities of outcomes can
be measured. This is then a situation of ‘risk’. If comparable
experience is not available from the past, then the situation is
said to be one of ‘uncertainty’. There can be gradations of
uncertainty depending on the number, kind and combination of
shocks hitting the economy.
In light of the kind of profound changes affecting financial
markets and banking along with the wider economy
7 in
conjunction with a high incidence of shocks, some of which were
of an unprecedented geopolitical nature, it could be said that the
early years of the new millennium were ones of uncertainty
rather than risk. Shocks to the economy can, in such
circumstances, give rise to cycles in confidence/uncertainty and
may be key to understanding money stock, credit and market
interest rate developments. Although uncertainty cannot be
measured, various proxies for it can be examined as potential
candidates to capture the effects of uncertainty.
The reasoning behind the inclusion of uncertainty in a money
demand model is to capture the effects of market sentiment
which leads to a shift in investment typically from longer-term
and riskier assets into more liquid money holdings included in
monetary aggregates, such as M3 money in the euro area. The
influence of uncertainty on money demand in the euro area has
been a prime issue for consideration in recent years, particularly
since 2001, as M3 growth has been high. The ECB has attributed
much of the strong growth in M3 between 2001 and 2003 to
what is called ‘‘portfolio shifts’’, a term to describe the
reallocation of investment portfolios from longer-term riskier
assets into shorter-term safer assets which are included in the
monetary aggregate M3. This effect is likely to have been larger
than previously experienced given that a greater number of
households were also beginning to access wider elements of the
financial markets, particularly equity markets, throughout the
1990s. In a euro area context in particular, the more traditional
7 Such as real-economy and financial-markets liberalisation, waves of financial innovation,
globalisation along with the changing composition of industry.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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models of money demand began to show varying signs of
instability since 2001 at a time when indicators began pointing
towards excess liquidity. In an attempt to find a stable money
demand model for the euro area that accounted for this period
of portfolio shifts and to explain the build up of excess liquidity,
models have been augmented in various ways including the
addition of uncertainty proxy variables.
A simple plot of the euro area industrial confidence indicator
against the annual rate of growth of the M3 money stock
illustrates quite forcefully the potentially important role of
uncertainty in money stock determination (see Chart 9). The
inverse correlation between money growth and this indicator of
industrial confidence, for the period April 2001 to May 2004, is
−0.62. For example, the dramatic decline in confidence
throughout 2001 is immediately evident as is the doubling in the
rate of growth of M3, which accompanied it. It should be clear
from this plot alone that any plausible explanation of
developments in money has to factor in uncertainty. It is also
clear from Chart 10 that an economic sentiment indicator or a
consumer confidence indicator are also inversely correlated with
money growth. However, the correlation of money growth with
the industrial confidence indicator is stronger than for these other
indicators, which is not surprising given that the non-financial
corporate sector accounted for the bulk of the growth in the
money stock during this period.
If a comprehensive measure of Knightian uncertainty were
available, then it is likely that the correlation in the figure would
be even higher. The high correlation for what is no doubt an


















































































Chart 9: Euro Area Industrial Confidence and M3 Annual Growth Rate
Source: Eurostat and ECB.
Index %
Industry Survey — Industrial
Confidence Indicator — LHS










Industry Survey — Industrial Confidence
Indicator — LHS











































Economic Sentiment Indicator — RHS
Chart 10: Euro Area Confidence and Sentiment Measures
Source: Eurostat.
Index Index
To proxy uncertainty in money demand, three types of variables
have been employed: market behaviour, measures of volatility
and measures of sentiment. Some money demand models
include equity market variables such as price index, turnover or
trading volume to capture an element of the financial market
transactions demand. Such market behaviour measures,
however, also incorporate an implied element of uncertainty, as
equity market data are inherently reflective of market sentiment,
which is driven by the (lack of) uncertainty. However, such
measures are more indicative of the transactions demand for
money for longer-term asset trading as each seller of an asset
requires a buyer irrespective of market uncertainty and therefore
such measures may not fully reveal the level of uncertainty.
A popular indicator of uncertainty is that manifested in stock
market behaviour. Chart 11 displays a quite strong long-run
positive correlation between money growth in the US (using the
conventional M2 money definition) and implied volatility in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) of futures share prices.
Reductions in volatility reflecting growing positive sentiment tend
to be associated with low money growth as the precautionary
demand for money wanes, and evidently vice-versa. This same
relationship is depicted in Chart 12 with both of these variables
subjected to a 12-month moving average, which is designed to
bring out the long-run correlation.
Using the same DJIA futures prices as proxy for uncertainty in
the euro area as well yields Chart 13. The relationship is not as
strong as for the US. It is also noticeable that the previous
positive correlation tends to break down, indeed reverse, at theQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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end of the period, which we have identified as one of
uncertainty, roughly from April 2001 to May 2004 (recall Chart
9 above). However, this change in the direction of the correlation

































































































M2 Annual Growth Rate — RHS
Chart 11: DJIA Volatility and US M2 Annual Growth Rate






















































M2 Annual Growth Rate — 12 Month M.Avg. — RHS
Chart 12: DJIA Volatility and US M2 Annual Growth
Rate — 12 Month Moving Averages
Source: Chicago and Board of Trade, FRED II and authors' calculations.


































































































M3 Annual Growth Rate — RHS
Chart 13: DJIA Volatility and Euro Area M3 Annual Growth Rate
Source: Chicago Board of Trade and ECB.
Index %
It is likely that different arguments in the money demand function
may be relevant over different time spans. It is likely that, in so-
called normal periods, money demand is driven by the standard
arguments one tends to find in typical demand for money
specifications, i.e., income and interest rates. In periods of
uncertainty, it will tend to be dominated by negative sentiment
about the economy (as illustrated above in Chart 9). The
transition between an environment of uncertainty and one of
restored confidence is a gradual one. Complex monetary
dynamics can also occur during this transition.
Although confidence may have been returning to financial
markets as reflected in increasing asset prices after April 2004,
central banks may have been reluctant to tighten monetary
policy too abruptly given the continuing sluggish real economy
and the ongoing threat of deflation (recall Charts 1 to 5 above,
all of which would support this kind of story). With such a
configuration of factors, a new driving force of money may take
over from uncertainty. This is the attraction of cheap leverage in
a context of reviving financial markets. Loan growth begins to
accelerate as investors begin to see the prospects of significant
gains from asset price appreciation. In this phase, loan growth
begins to take over from ‘portfolio shifts’ as a new driving force
inflating monetary aggregates (see Section 7 of the paper below
where this issue is discussed in more detail and Chart 19 therein).
The new emerging generic determinant of money growth is
therefore the expected gross return on a range of asset prices
relative to the cost of leveraged funding for market participants
8.
8 Of course, deriving empirical counterparts for these variables to use in demand for money
studies poses fairly obvious problems.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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It is our interpretation that the rapid growth in the euro area
money stock between early 2001 and early 2004 does not
constitute a disequilibrium or an overhang. This is because it was
being voluntarily held in the then prevailing environment of
uncertainty. The overhang (in the sense of money balances that
people no longer want to hold) only emerges at the end of this
period of uncertainty. If, at this point, potential investors realise
that the ‘wall of money’ that will be released by the inevitable
process of dishoarding following the attenuation of uncertainty
is likely to precipitate a generalised ‘search for yield’, they will be
all the more determined to maximise their leverage to avail of
perceived rich pickings in financial markets while benefiting from
low borrowing costs. The money/stock market volatility
correlation gets reversed and becomes negative as the rapid
growth in credit now boosts money stock growth while the
economy and confidence recover. Another notable feature of
the measure of volatility in Charts 11 and 13 is its very low level,
which has persisted over roughly the last three years. This would








































M3 Annual Growth Rate — RHS
Chart 14: Euro Area/US Sentiment and M3 Annual Growth Rate
Source: Eurostat, FRED II, ECB and authors' calculations.
Ratio %
Another feature not addressed in the research and which may
be an explanatory component is that of uncertainty outside the
euro area. While uncertainty inside the euro area will determine,
in principle, how agents will allocate their portfolio between long-
and short-term assets, the relative uncertainty between the euro
area and external markets will determine whether residents
allocate their money in the euro area or in such external markets.
Equally, such measures of relative uncertainty will determine
whether finance from external markets will be reallocated into
the euro area. This will also be partially determined by the rateQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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of return on offer and the cost of finance and this could be an
explanatory factor behind investment inflows into the euro area
in recent years. With financial innovation enabling an increasing
global financial market and with derivatives and synthetic
instruments increasingly allowing positions in markets to be
taken without the actual trading out or transfer of notional
amounts, it is a moot point whether the driving forces of money
demand are exclusively domestic and, accordingly, a measure
of relative uncertainty may be more appropriate than a purely
domestic measure (see Chart 14).
4. Shocks, Uncertainty and Money Demand and
Supply
4.1 Relative Yields on Money in Different States of Nature
The conventional wisdom has it that all other financial assets
dominate money in terms of yield or return. This is inspired by
the observation that a significant proportion of the total money
stock does not attract an explicit rate of return or, where it does
attract a return, it tends to be fairly small relative to market rates
of return on competing asset classes. This, on the face of it, looks
like a fairly plausible statement. Although it may be true on
average over time, it is not a correct statement in all
circumstances (or, technically, in all ‘‘states of nature’’). In periods
of heightened uncertainty, following a major shock, or a
combination of shocks to the economy, the expected short-term,
or even the expected short- to medium-term, return on financial
assets may be negative, and indeed substantially so, in nominal
terms. Since the rate of return on money cannot be negative in
nominal terms
9, then, in such circumstances, the yield on money
will tend to dominate that on all other financial assets
10.
Substitution into money and out of financial assets in periods of
financial turbulence reflects, in part at least, a desperate attempt
by both individuals and firms to preserve financial wealth. This
rush to the safe haven of money will tend to be especially in
evidence following periods when financial wealth has been
boosted by an asset price boom.
Therefore, an economic environment of prolonged or pervasive
uncertainty can have unusually large effects on peoples’ desire
to hold money balances. There are many reasons for this and
they all derive from the many roles which classical monetary
theory ascribes to money, namely medium of transactions, unit
of account and store of value, which, in turn, determine the three
dominant motives for holding money. These are the transactions,
precautionary, and speculative motives. Traditional money
demand functions tend to focus mainly on money as a
9 Abstracting from banks’ failure to honour convertibility of deposits into cash because of
either illiquidity or insolvency problems.
10 It is noteworthy that one of the four selection criteria proposed by the EMI and accepted
by the ECB Governing Council for bank liabilities to be included in the money stock is
capital certainty.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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transactions medium and therefore on the transactions motive
for holding money to the neglect of the precautionary and
speculative motives. In circumstances where these two latter
motives might be expected to be to the fore, i.e., ones of
heightened uncertainty, traditional transactions-based
approaches to the demand for money will fail to account for
monetary developments.
But the role of money as a store of value enhances its
attractiveness and peoples’ willingness to hold it for both
precautionary and speculative reasons. Money is a good store of
value (indeed, it may be the only credible and reliable one) in
stressed financial conditions. Therefore, the precautionary
demand for money is likely to increase and possibly substantially
in such conditions. Stressed financial circumstances may also
promote the speculative motivation for holding money. This is
because the collapse in financial asset prices (typically the reason
for the uncertainty) may lead investors to believe that there will
be good investment opportunities available in financial markets
once the uncertainty dissipates and confidence returns to
markets. It may make sense (as suggested by one of the
theoretical rationales for buffer stock money) for agents to hold
additional money balances in portfolios so as to be in a position
of avail of such opportunities when they arise. Indeed, in periods
of financial stress there may be an additional source of
transactions demand stemming from increased turnover in
financial markets necessitating additional money balances to
mediate these financial market transactions. This could account
for the very rapid growth in deposit holdings by OFIs.
11
All of the above factors have been in play for some time. It
therefore cannot by itself be an explanation for the type of new
monetary dynamics, which have been and are now impinging on
monetary growth in the euro area and elsewhere. What is
relatively new and fits the bill of contributing to an explanation
of these dynamics, are basically two phenomena, the growing
democratisation of financial markets and sounder money.
4.2 Growing Retail Involvement in Financial Markets
There have been considerable developments in financial markets
since the mid-1990s that have corresponded to a period of
increased financial market participation by wider segments of the
money-holding sector, particularly households. Such a period of
financial innovation has also corresponded to a period of strong
11 An ‘Other Financial Institution’ (OFI) is defined as a corporation or quasi-corporation other
than an insurance corporation and pension fund that is engaged mainly in financial
intermediation by incurring liabilities in forms other than currency, deposits and/or close
substitutes for deposits from institutional entities other than MFIs, in particular those
engaged primarily in long-term financing, such as corporations engaged in financial leasing,
financial vehicle corporations created to be holders of securitised assets, financial holding
corporations, dealers in securities and derivatives (when dealing for their own account),
venture capital corporations and development capital companies.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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money growth across many economies. The question then arises
as to whether there is a causality running across these trends. If
there is, intuition suggests that such causality runs from financial
innovation and increased market participation to money growth.
First, historical trends illustrate that there have been many
previous episodes of strong money growth that have not
corresponded to a period of notable financial innovation nor
with any notable degree of increased financial market
participation by wider elements of the money holding sector.
While this suggests that financial innovation in itself does not
cause all episodes of strong money growth, the number of
periods of strong money growth does tend to suggest that
reverse causation from money to financial innovation is not
present.
Secondly, examination of the method in which many new
financial market products are transacted and settled also suggests
that they may be partly accounting for the strong growth in
money holdings. Derivatives and synthetic products in particular
may be having an impact in this regard. Derivatives products
allow a position to be taken in a financial market, be it for
hedging or speculative purposes, without actually purchasing a
conventional financial product to the value of the nominal
exposure.
For example, an equity index futures derivatives contract to a
notional value of US$1 million could be agreed between two
parties whereby one party agrees to buy US$1 million worth of
an index at value Y at time T (e.g., agreeing to buy 1,000 units
of an index at $1,000 per unit). In this case, a contract with a
notional value of US$1 million would not actually result in US$1
million worth of equities changing hands but the difference in
price times the number of units would be the actual cash amount
to change hands. While the price of derivatives contracts are
fixed on day of contract and payment is not made until later,
parties involved in the contract will have to put up a margin in
the form of cash (or sometimes Treasury bills) to demonstrate
they have the liquid resources to honour the contract. In
addition, futures contracts in particular can be marked-to-market
whereby each day any profits or losses on the contracts are
calculated and discharged and a new position is, in effect,
opened up the next day. It is easily apparent that while the actual
amounts that are discharged in settlement of derivatives
contracts are much smaller than the notional contract amount,
the settlement process and the often unlimited potential
exposure necessitates that the parties involved in the contract
have significantly larger cash balances on hand than the usual
netting amount in order to be in a position to clear potentially
higher losses. In essence, derivatives contracts allow a position
to be taken in a financial market while holding a significantQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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amount of the contract value on deposit. This illustrates how this
form of financial innovation and increased financial market
participation has had the corollary effect of contributing to strong
money growth.
The mechanism whereby a position can be taken in a financial
market without actually buying a physical commodity or share
certificate or currency is not confined to derivatives products.
Synthetic debt instruments also enable similar netting of profit
and loss positions at the redemption date of contracts on a range
of underlying asset classes from mortgage books to junk bonds.
Such synthetic arrangements, for example credit default swaps
or total return swaps, are contained in synthetic debt instruments
known as collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). In the case of a CDO
containing a total return swap on junk bonds for example, such
a synthetic instrument within a CDO would provide a return
(loss) to the noteholders to the degree that the yield on the junk
bond is higher (lower) than that contracted to in the swap. Similar
synthetic instruments can be used to purchase the return on a
portfolio of mortgages from a bank, but with the mortgages
remaining on the balance sheet of the bank. Special purpose
vehicles
12 (SPV), the entities that issue such types of asset-backed
debt instruments, issue notes in the CDO programme. By
entering into synthetic arrangements, the SPV does not have to
physically purchase bonds or mortgage books but enters into
credit return agreements whereby the return or loss of the
underlying asset determines whether the bond noteholders will
receive a profit or suffer a loss. Similar to the derivatives
arrangement outlined above, the SPV, or other parties entering
into these contracts, needs to maintain a fairly liquid cash or
bond balance in order to net out the positions of the synthetic
contracts it has entered into. This has further contributed to the
growth rate in money, particularly when viewed in the context
of deposits by OFIs at MFIs.
Other financial innovations and financial market products which
have seen a considerable increase in participation from wider
segments of the money holding sector include mutual funds.
These funds typically sell units of a wider fund to investors and
may contain equities, bonds, property, cash or a combination of
these. These funds require a stock of liquid funds to be held in
order to be in a position to meet the demand for unit
redemptions. As the volume of investment in such types of funds
increases, then the amount of liquid funds needed to service
regular redemptions or withdrawals from the funds rises
commensurately. To the extent that a range of these funds are
managed funds, further liquid balances need to be maintained in
order to carry out the transactions that enable the portfolio of
12 These come under the category of Other Financial Institutions (OFIs).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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the fund to be altered in line with its managed strategy. An
extension of the mutual funds model but with an investment
portfolio of derivative and synthetic instruments such as those
outlined above is hedge funds. These can also operate on a unit
style investment basis. Further developments have seen the more
recent creation of funds of hedge funds, which enable smaller
ticket investors to buy units of a fund that invests in hedge funds,
thereby adding another layer of transactions that require cash
balances to be held to meet unit redemptions and portfolio
management.
Securitisation transactions have also contributed to the growth
rate of money. Without a securitisation of mortgages for
example, a bank issues a loan which is repaid gradually over time
and as the money is returned to the bank it lends it back out
again. Securitisation, however, allows the bank to sell the
mortgages off its balance sheet and lend out the receipts to the
mortgage market straight away. These loans are initially
deposited by the loan recipient and then by a builder or house
seller in the short term. The SPV which purchases the mortgage
portfolio and issues the mortgage-backed bonds uses the initial
receipts from selling notes in the bonds to purchase the
mortgage book from a bank. It only recovers the value of the
mortgages over the actual life of the mortgage. Over this period,
the SPV will have to make coupon payments to noteholders at
regular intervals. The SPV will therefore have to maintain a cash
balance from which to draw funds to service these payments.
Typically, SPVs will also enter into interest rate swap contracts to
hedge themselves as the margin for profit is relatively tight
between the rate at which the mortgages are issued and the rate
at which they issue the bonds. These interest rate derivatives, as
shown, further necessitate a cash balance to be held over the life
of the contract. Again, these activities largely represent those of
the OFIs sector and may account to a large degree for the rapid
growth in deposit holdings by this sector.
While the dominant focus on the financial products outlined
above is deeply rooted in the more riskier elements of financial
markets and the nature of some of these products restricts them
to large and more riskier market participants, it can be seen that
they are largely settled and played out in the liquid money
markets. It would appear, therefore, that increased participation
in these products has contributed to the strong growth rate of
money. In essence, the financial market democratisation that has
taken place has led to both easier and cheaper access to financial
markets particularly for the household sector. This increased
access to the financial markets is evidenced by a number of
trends.
It is evident that financial markets have evolved very rapidly both
domestically in most advanced industrial countries as well asQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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internationally. Although still remaining fairly limited, stock
ownership has increased significantly in advanced industrial
countries. Only a comparatively small proportion of the overall
population hold equities as part of their portfolios. While stock
ownership has increased very substantially in the US since 1989,
household stock market participation as a percentage of all
households was still only half (49 per cent to be precise) in 1998,
where this figure includes both direct and indirect holdings. The
corresponding figures for the UK, Germany, France, Italy and the
Netherlands were 31 per cent, 23 per cent, 26 per cent, 8 per
cent, and 24 per cent, respectively
13.
One of the most salient developments over the last few decades
has been the predominance of institutional investors. Insurance
companies, pension funds and mutual funds have grown
substantially in relative importance, with the result that deposits
as a percentage of gross financial assets has fallen in most
countries. Chart 15 illustrates the ratio of households’ total
mutual funds to total bank deposits in the US between 1952 and
2006. This ratio has seen a remarkable increase, from about 0.2
in the mid-1980s to about 1.3 in 2000. Although the ratio
declined slightly during the subsequent period of uncertainty, it
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Chart 15: Ratio of US Households' Total Mutual Funds to
Total Bank Deposits
Source: US Board of Governors Flow of Funds.
All the available data clearly point to a progressive
democratisation of financial markets
14. Household participation
in wider financial markets has increased steadily and has
accelerated since the start of the 1990s. This is the new element
on the economic landscape that is having major episodic effects
13 See Maddaloni et al, (2006).
14 There is little reason to doubt but that the ageing of populations will intensify this process
as pension assets rise.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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on money growth. Financial markets democratisation is having
two effects. First, it is causing the ratio of money (dominated by
bank deposits) to fall as a proportion of financial assets. But this
trend is intermittently interrupted by massive substitution out of
financial assets and into bank deposits as investors rush to the
safe haven of bank deposits in turbulent market conditions. This
is essentially the reason why the cyclical behaviour of money and
interest rates is different this time round.
4.3 Sounder Money
Two major changes to the institutional scenery affecting financial
markets, banking and money provide the background to the
argument in the paper. The first is the progressive
democratisation of financial markets just noted. This has been
accompanied by another equally important trend at least from
the point of view being propounded here, namely that towards
sounder money. A whole range of regulatory, as well as
deregulatory, measures pertaining to banking, as well as ongoing
financial innovation, have served to make banks safer over the
last ten to twenty years and have, accordingly, tended to reduce
the riskiness of these deposit liabilities as financial assets to hold.
Since these comprise the bulk of the money stock, this
development has helped to underpin the trend towards sounder
money. Although these developments are important in
enhancing the acceptability of bank deposits as stores of value
and as transactions media, they can have unintended side effects
for asset prices in periods of financial turbulence.
It is probably not an exaggeration to say that money, as an asset,
is now safer than at any time in the past. A fairly elaborate legal
and regulatory infrastructure has been put in place in all
advanced industrial countries to support the role of banks in the
economy but, more specifically, the role of bank deposits as
transactions media or a financial asset. A number of distinct
aspects of support for bank deposits can be identified.
The first is long-standing arrangements reflected in a combination
of provisions relating to the legal redeemability of bank deposits
in terms of central bank money and laws of legal tender that
apply to the latter. Central bank money at the retail level is par
value, a status conferred on it by the law of legal tender, which
denotes money (notes and coin
15) that a creditor is obliged by
law to take in cancellation of a debt arising from a transaction if
tendered by a purchaser. Since the law of the land can enforce
this obligation at any moment in time, the nominal par value of
notes and coin is maintained over time. Since bank deposits are
legally redeemable in terms of notes and coin, legal tender laws
effectively confer the same constancy of purchasing power on
bank deposits. In other words, legal tender (although it does not
15 There may be separate maximum limits to the total values of both notes and coin that a
creditor is obliged in law to take in a transaction. These limits vary across countries.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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apply directly to bank deposits
16) helps, when combined with
statutory redeemability, to confer par value status on bank
deposits and, being par value, bank deposits are not exposed to
market or interest rate risk. Of course, if the deposit-issuing bank
defaults, it will not be in a position to respect its statutory
redeemability obligation vis-a `-vis depositors exposing the latter to
default risk. However, there have also been big reductions in the
vulnerability of US banks to default over recent decades.
Although these measures have been in place for a very long time,
regulatory and other developments have helped to underpin
their credibility.
A factor that has assisted banks in this respect is liquidity-related
regulation. Reserve requirements have been reduced over time
and this has helped to reduce the cost base for banks. Despite
this reduction, banks nevertheless remain in a good position to
access central bank money, via both easier access to the primary
market as well as cheap access to a deep and efficient secondary
market, and use their accounts at the central bank to acquire
notes and coin enabling them to facilitate customers who wish
to redeem bank deposits. Enabling banks to deliver more easily
on their legal redeemability obligations has also helped to bolster
the par value nature of bank deposits.
Another bulwark supporting deposits, which is designed to tackle
uncertainty arising from the risk of default, is the prudentially
inspired set of regulations surrounding the banking industry,
summarised in the term ‘‘the safety net’’. These regulations,
which have both the objective and the effect of bolstering the
par value status of deposits, have also been reinforced in recent
years culminating in the introduction of Basle 2 capital
adequacy ratios.
Other measures of supervision and regulation, as well as
deregulation, have also, arguably, contributed to the soundness
of US banks. On the deregulatory front in relation to the US
banking system, for example, the decision to repeal previous
regulations, i.e., the McFadden and more recently the Glass-
Steagel Acts, is also no doubt making a contribution to the
stability and soundness of the banking industry in the US by
allowing greater portfolio diversification both by region and
product range. By enabling banks to diversify risks, it helps to
render their balance sheets less vulnerable to idiosyncratic
shocks. Banks should, on balance, be sounder as a result.
Another very relevant aspect of regulation to the current
discussion relates to deposit insurance. This is compulsory for a
business wishing to hold a bank charter. These insurance
schemes typically insure the full capital value of deposits up to
16 Legal tender laws do apply to bank deposits in the Netherlands.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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fairly generous amounts. This is especially so for the US where
coverage has increased over time and now stands at $100,000.
Add to this the scope for the same depositor to have a number of
deposits insured and this can amount to almost blanket insurance
coverage. Except for Italy, the coverage of deposit insurance
schemes in Europe tends to be significantly less generous.
17
These schemes were established in the late 1970s, or during the
1980s or in the first half of the 1990s for the most part. They
transfer the risk of default losses from depositors to either the
government or some private market institution that absorbs the
risk at a price. Depositors then receive a guarantee with respect
to the capital value of their deposits along with a typically fairly
low rate of interest depending on the type of deposit. This
substitutes for the bank having to pay the depositor a variable
credit risk premium. Deposit insurance can, and almost certainly
has at times, contributed to weakness in the banking system by
removing the incentive of the depositor to monitor bank
performance and to withdraw funds from the bank if the bank is
deemed to be pursuing unwise loan underwriting policies.
Nevertheless, the deposit guarantee makes deposits much more
attractive as an asset from the perspective of the individual
depositor. When combined with all the other benign
developments affecting the robustness of the US banking system,
depositors probably feel more assured about the negative moral
hazard implications of deposit insurance.
In addition to the reductions in default risk, banks in many
countries, but more especially in the US, have been reducing
their exposure to remaining loan default risk by selling this risk
to other financial institutions, apparently insurance companies for
the most part. The use of credit derivatives and securitisation to
offload loan risk has grown exponentially in recent years.
Between the mid-1990s and 2003, the return on equity was
higher than at any time in the previous thirty years. A significant
fraction of this improved performance is attributable to structural
innovations especially more effective risk management, which
emerged as a distinct bank discipline in the 1990s
18.
These developments should promote stability of the banking
system since they facilitate a more optimal allocation of risk
across the whole economy. Since the banking system seems to
be net sellers of credit risk, especially in the US, the total amount
of bank loan portfolio risk has probably fallen. This is also clearly
another factor supporting the safety of bank deposits. Partly on
account of this, banks in the US are now prudentially sounder
than they have been for some time.
The bottom line with respect to the health of the US banking
system is probably best summarised by the FDIC Quarterly
17 See Garcia (1999) for fuller discussion of deposit insurance system features in EU countries.
18 See Schuermann (2004).Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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Banking Profile. This notes that the number of problem
institutions is down from almost 1,500 in 1990 to 114 (during
the 2001 recession) and 53 in the first six months of 2007. The
value of problem assets is down from $640 billion to $21 billion
over the same time period.
All of the above developments supporting the safety of deposits
have been strengthened systematically over time. An exception
is redeemability, which has been in force for a very long time.
The variance of the return on money, although always quite low,
has become progressively lower over time with the result that it
is now virtually capital certain. Accordingly, the attractiveness of
money as a safe haven has been enhanced over time making it
an even more attractive asset to hold in periods of heightened
uncertainty. This also means that the status of money as an asset
is also stronger especially in periods of heightened uncertainty.
We would therefore expect the safe haven role of money to
have been significantly enhanced by these measures and would,
accordingly, expect the demand for money as a store of value to
increase and possibly quite substantially in periods of financial
stress.
5. Money and Interest Rate Dynamics in a New
Setting
5.1 Time-Varying Motives for Holding Money and
Consequences for Interest Rates
The taxonomy in Table 1 illustrates the time-varying motives for
holding money and how these are likely to differ between normal
and financially distressed periods. If, as might be expected, the
effects of the precautionary and speculative motives for holding
money, along with the enhanced transactions motive generated
by the quickening pace of financial market transactions, are
sufficiently strong, then they can collectively more than
compensate for the reduction in the transactions demand for
money coming from any cyclical or post-shock slowing of the
real economy. In the wake of any such event, giving rise to
widespread uncertainty, money demand could increase
substantially and money growth could accelerate even as output
growth slows.
Given the kind of uncertain conditions that prevailed in many
economies in the first three to four years of the new millennium,
these types of motives for holding money would have been to
the fore. We would therefore have expected to see an
acceleration in the growth rate of money — exactly what was
observed. This is the first time in recent history that money stock
growth behaved in this way (recall Charts 3 and 4). However,
most standard attempts to estimate money demand functions
tend to focus exclusively on the transactions motive with modest
inference to opportunity cost and pay little or no attention to thisQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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phenomenon. They would therefore find it difficult to account
for what happened to money growth in the early years of the
new millennium.
Table 1: Demand for Money According to Motive Under
Normal and Stressed Financial Market Conditions
In Normal Times In Periods of Financial
Distress
Transactions Demand in Real Normal Level (as determined Relatively Low (as real
Economy by standard demand for economy slows)
money function)
Transactions Demand in Relatively Low (but subject to Relatively High (as volume of
Financial Markets trend growth with financial transactions in financial
market deepening) markets increases sharply)
Precautionary Demand Low High
Speculative Demand Low High
In periods of pervasive uncertainty like that which existed in the
wake of the dotcom bubble, not only does objective risk and
uncertainty increase sharply, people’s aversion to risk or
uncertainty is also likely to increase. Such periods are likely to
see a general aversion to holding any marked-to-market assets
except those that are issued by governments and are of very
short maturity, such as short-dated treasury bills.
Interest Rate
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Consider the situation of a financial system shock, as illustrated
in Figure 1. This will typically have two types of effects. The first
of these effects impacts on money and financial markets. The
uncertainty ensuing from the shock causes heightened liquidity
preference. In other words, there is a large increase (upward
shift) in the demand for money. This increase in demand canQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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come from all of the motives for holding money, i.e., the
transactions, precautionary and speculative noted above. In the
circumstances of a financial system shock, the most important of
those is probably the precautionary motive. Investors substitute
into money, which provides a secure store of value and therefore
a safe haven from the turmoil in financial markets in
circumstances of uncertainty. The transactions and speculative
demand for money may also be prominent in such
circumstances, the former because turbulence may result in
more market churning and the latter because investors may want
to hold more money for speculative motives. The shift in
preference for liquidity could be substantial. For a fixed real
money stock (M0/P0), the interest rate is driven up from R0 to R1.
There is also a second effect of the shock to the financial system.
This is a negative impact on investment and possibly also
consumption expenditures. The uncertainty generated by the
shock discourages firms from taking the kind of long-term
perspective needed for investments with typically long gestation
periods and also dents consumer confidence. The overall effect
is to slow the pace of economic activity.
It is therefore clear that an uncertainty-inducing adverse shock
(or, as happened in the early years of the new millennium, a
simultaneous cluster of adverse shocks) can result in a perverse
reaction of the interest rate. While circumstances are calling for
a reduction in interest rates because of the likely damage to
economic activity coming from the shock, people’s preference
for liquidity is instead driving interest rates in the wrong direction.
Any such increase in interest rates would, of course, exacerbate
the initial negative reaction of investment to the shock. The
direction in which the interest rate is pushed, mainly by the
liquidity preference of financial market participants, is therefore
opposite to that required by the real economy. Indeed, since the
interest rate is the cornerstone of asset prices, an increase in
interest rates is likely to cause other asset prices to fall as well,
thereby increasing funding costs more generally. Liquidity
preference prevents what would otherwise be a self-correcting
mechanism (a fall in interest rates following the initial shock to
the financial system) from operating. In other words, financial
and money markets react perversely relative to the needs of the
real economy and, because of a combination of the
developments in financial markets and those supporting the
soundness of money, this perverse effect is likely to be
exacerbated.
Other knock-on effects coming from heightened liquidity
preference can reinforce these adverse effects on the real
economy. One such effect is that new and seasoned offerings
on securities markets tend to dry up completely following majorQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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shocks, making it virtually impossible for firms to raise capital on
the open market and driving them back into the bank loan
market putting upward pressure on interest rates (see Chart 16).
Heightened liquidity preference will also tend to change the
composition of banks’ liabilities in favour of more liquid shorter-
maturity deposits, which, for any given prior level of maturity
transformation, will manifest itself in a reduced willingness of
banks to lend (albeit mitigated somewhat by their ability to
securitise their loan products). In extreme cases, this could result
in what’s known as a credit crunch. Excluding this extreme case,
we would still be confronted with a situation in which an
increased demand for loans is met with a reduced bank
willingness (ability) to lend thereby placing further upward
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Chart 16: Annual Growth Rate in Quoted Shares Issued by Euro
Area Residents and Industrial Confidence Indicator
Source: ECB and Eurostat.
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In the absence of any kind of a monetary policy reaction, there
are therefore a number of effects, all reinforcing each other,
which stem from liquidity preference following a major shock, or
combination of shocks, and which drive the economy away from
its initial pre-shock equilibrium. In other words, the economy
could, and most likely would, be confronted with a dangerous
development whereby falling investment and consumption lead
to falling incomes and increasing unemployment. This would
tend to drive liquidity preference and interest rates even higher,
which, in turn, would exacerbate the conjunctural situation in the
real economy. Although this type of effect has long been present
in market economies, Keynes being the first to bring it to notice,
the contention here is that its strength has been reinforced by
new developments in financial and money markets.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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5.2 Money Supply Response
With such an unacceptable vista in the offing, the central bank
typically steps in to obviate any such adverse and damaging
development. Knowing that this type of financial and money
market reaction would occur, it acts pre-emptively. It provides
sufficient liquidity into the economy to head off any incipient
tendency for the interest rate to increase and to maintain it at
least at its original level (R0 in Figure 1 above). Indeed, it may
deem it wise to push rates lower than this as insurance against
the dampening effect of pervasive uncertainty. This reaction is
probably typified by the following quote from the former Fed
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, speaking in the context of periods of
liquidity crises: ‘‘Such crises are precipitated by the efforts of
market participants to convert illiquid assets into cash. When
confronted with uncertainty, especially Knightian uncertainty,
human beings invariably attempt to disengage from medium- to
long-term commitments in favour of safety and liquidity. Because
economies, of necessity, are net long — that is, have net real
assets — attempts to flee these assets cause prices of equity
assets to fall, in some cases dramatically...T h eimmediate
response on the part of the central bank to such financial
implosions must be to inject large quantities of liquidity . . .’’
19.
What Greenspan is talking about here is a general loosening of
the stance of monetary policy and not the type of temporary
lending associated with lender of last resort to individual
institutions. The results of research carried out by Rudebusch
(2005) support this view of monetary policy with the residuals
from a Taylor Rule estimation highly correlated with period of
financial stress.
The picture that emerges with respect to money is of two things
happening at the same time. On the demand side, uncertainty is
driving what is likely to be, in the circumstances, a huge increase
in the demand for money stemming from all three motives for
holding money balances while, on the supply side, the central
bank is providing central bank money in infinitely elastic amounts
at these lower rates of interest to prevent interest rates rising.
This elastic supply of central bank money provides the reserves
to the commercial banks to allow them to offer bank loans at
current or lower rates and possibly better terms. It accordingly
supplies inside money in greater amounts to the private non-
bank sector of the economy, which wishes to hold these
additional amounts at more or less unchanged rates of interest.
The accommodating role of the central bank can be seen in the
rapid growth in the monetary base (see Charts 17 and 18). These
graphs suggest that the growth in outside money (or monetary
base) has largely accommodated the demand for inside money
(various money aggregates).
19 Greenspan: ‘‘Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy’’, remarks at the American Economic




























































































Chart 17: Euro Area Base Money and M3
Source: ECB.
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Chart 18: US Money Stock and Monetary Base
Source: FRED II.
$ bn $ bn
The upshot of this money demand/money supply interaction is a
sharp acceleration in the money stock growth. This happened (as
we can see for the US from Charts 3 and 4 and for the euro area
from Chart 5) even in a situation in which the economy is slowing
and probably slowing quite sharply as the prevailing uncertainty
dampens household and corporate confidence and weakens
actual consumer expenditure and corporate investment. We
therefore get an outcome in which the money stock acceleratesQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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as the economy slows. This is exactly what happened in the
recent slowdown in the world economy in the first few years of
the new century. This pattern (again, see Charts 3, 4 and 5) is also
unprecedented in the sense that in previous cyclical downturns
money stock growth slowed rather than accelerated as
happened in the most recent downturn.
Although velocity was already trended downwards in the lead
up to shocks of the early years of the new millennium (no doubt
attributable to the long-run decline in inflation and nominal
interest rates), the rapid growth in the money stock triggered a
new steeper downward trend in velocity, which has continued
to this day.
The question naturally arises as to why this particular episode of
uncertainty at the turn of the century had this specific effect on
money and credit aggregates and interest rates. It begs the
question as to why previous episodes of uncertainty did not have
similar effects in the past. It is clear that there has been some
kind of structural shift in monetary dynamics.
6. Money Disequilibrium Resolution
It has been argued above that the money stock could grow very
quickly in periods of turbulence even if the pace of economic
activity is slowing. This could happen in a policy setting in which
the central bank keeps its policy rate low and meets all demands
at this low rate. When the uncertainty, which gave rise to the
precautionary and speculative demand for money, dissipates, as
it started to do apparently towards the end of 2003, it leaves
an excess supply (or overhang) in its wake. Excess supply is a
disequilibrium, which has to be resolved. The issue addressed in
this section is how is it resolved.
The analysis here is for a closed economy and therefore there is
no foreign sector. There are, accordingly, only three sectors, the
money-creating sector (MC), the money-holding sector (MH) and
the money-neutral sector (MN). According to the EMI/ECB
statistical implementation package, the category of monetary
financial institutions (MFIs) has been identified so as to
encompass those financial institutions, which are deemed to
contribute to the creation of money in the euro area. The
emphasis is added here to underline that this is the sector that
adds to, or subtracts from, the nominal money stock. Great care
was devoted to including in the MFI sector only those financial
institutions whose liabilities could be deemed to be money and
to exclude the liabilities of institutions whose liabilities could not
be deemed to be money. Notable here, incidentally, is the
inclusion of money market funds (MMFs) in the MFI list.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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The monthly consolidated balance sheet of the MFI sector
provides for a definition of the money-holding sector comprising
‘‘other residents non-MFIs’’ (consisting of other financial
institutions, insurance companies and pension funds, non-
financial corporations and households) or ‘‘other resident non-
MFIs plus other general government’’ (the latter comprising state
government, local authorities and State Security Funds). The
‘‘central government’’ is deemed to be included, in principle, in
a ‘‘money neutral sector’’ and hence excluded from both the
money-creating sector
20 and the money holding sector. In short,
the MC sector (MH sector) was carefully selected to include only
(to exclude) those institutions, which could (could not) be
deemed to create money.
In a closed economy, the money-holding sector cannot affect
the level of the nominal money stock by engaging in portfolio
transactions vis-a `-vis other counterparties in the money-holding
sector. All they can succeed in doing is exchanging the existing
level of aggregate money balances between themselves. In any
exchange of money for bonds, an entity purchasing bonds has
an incipient excess supply of money equal to the market value
of the bonds exchanged while the seller of the bonds has an
incipient excess demand for money also equal to the market
value of the bonds exchanged. Clearly, the aggregate excess
demand for money is, by definition, equal to zero. Therefore,
portfolio operations conducted by members of the MH sector
vis-a `-vis other members of the MH sector cannot affect the level
of the nominal or real money stock outstanding.
It is also clear from the last section and from basic monetary
analysis that one of the most important sources of money
creation comes from extending loans to the private sector of the
economy. In general, it would not seem to make sense for a
borrower to raise a loan and hold the receipts of the loan in an
idle bank balance. The purpose of taking out a loan is to engage
in some form of expenditure. So the deposit created by the loan
ends up as someone else’s bank deposit. Therefore, those who
hold excess money balances are in general not those who have
leveraged themselves in the bank loan market. Accordingly, a
contraction of the money stock arising from any such excess
money balances will not, in the first instance, typically occur via
loan redemption.
However, the portfolio actions in standard demand for money
functions involve members of the MH sector engaging in
portfolio transactions with other members of the MH sector. All
these transactions do is to transfer existing money balances
between existing members of the MH sector. Since these money
20 Except for coins, a fact which we ignore in the following analysis.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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balances are par value, their value cannot change in the transfer
process. It follows that the portfolio behaviour of the MH sector
as a whole cannot affect the level of the nominal money stock
nor, a fortiori, the real money stock
21. Something else must
adjust to restore equilibrium. The case is illustrated in Figure 2
below. Since the money stock is fixed, equilibrium can only be
restored, in the face of an excess supply of money, by a fall in
the rate of interest.










The representation in Figure 3 below is only valid for a rightward
shift in the money demand schedule. The central bank sets the
interest rate at R — its target level. It has to supply whatever
money is demanded at R in order to maintain the rate at this
targeted level. Any amount of funds demanded at this level will
be supplied to bank counterparties. Abstracting from rationing in
the loan market and the portfolio behaviour of the banks, we can
characterise the supply of inside money as also being in infinitely
elastic supply. Any arbitrarily large rightward shift in money
demand will be accommodated completely at the going rate R.
The rightward shift in the money demand schedule could be very
substantial in a period of severe financial turbulence. For financial
stability and other reasons, central banks are especially anxious
to accommodate this demand
22. Otherwise, the interest rate will
react perversely and aggravate the uncertainty driving money
demand.
21 The only way in which the money stock might shrink, in the closed economy being
considered here, is for the MH sector to engage in proprietary portfolio transactions with
the MC sector. This rarely if ever happens. Another possibility is if MH sector were to buy
government bonds in the primary issue market. In this case, the money would be transferred
from the MH sector to the MN sector and would therefore fall. But again this is a relatively
rarefied case.
22 Indeed, as indicated by Greenspan in the above quote, they may be proactive in doing so.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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However, the uncertainty driving the escalating preference for
liquidity inevitably dissipates at some stage. When it does, the
demand for money falls. But the nominal money stock does not
fall with falling demand. Therefore, unlike in the case of an
increase in money demand (which can be accommodated by a
pari passu increase in supply brought about by largely passive
response of the central bank and its monetary policy
counterparties, the commercial banks), a fall in the demand for
money does not result in a corresponding fall in the stock of
money outstanding. In other words, an incipient money
disequilibrium caused by an increase in the demand for money
is more or less instantaneously corrected by an elastic money
supply. By way of contrast, however, a money disequilibrium
caused by a reduction in the demand for money is not corrected
by some automatic absorption of the surplus, so there is an
important assymetry.
Although an individual money holder can reduce his/her money
holdings by transacting in the market and purchasing either
goods and services or some financial asset, the economy as a
whole cannot reduce its nominal money holdings. When
individuals conduct so-called ‘inside’ transactions, all that
happens is a transfer of excess money balances from one
member of the money-holding sector to another, leaving
economy-wide excess money unaffected. The only way excess
money can be removed from the economy is if a transaction
occurs vis-a `-vis either the MC sector (i.e., the banking system,
including the central bank), the MN sector (i.e., the government)
or the foreign sector. A leakage could easily occur through the
foreign sector. However, none of these cases would be likely to
be of such a size, either individually or collectively, that oneQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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could argue that the configuration in Figure 3 is a faithful
representation of reality in the case of a fall in the demand for
money.
The traditional monetarist account of how this kind of money
disequilibrium is eliminated is a reduction in the real money stock
(but no change in the nominal money stock) brought about by
an increase in the price level. This, in turn, is the result of money
holders endeavouring in the aggregate to offload their surplus
money holdings by buying goods and services. The large
monetary overhang that is believed to have arisen in the euro
area, and indeed globally, has not yet at any rate, shown any
signs of being corrected by accelerating inflation. However, an
alternative correction mechanism for restoring monetary
equilibrium may now be operative. The cost and ease of access
to financial markets has improved over the last few decades.
There is now likely to be a much broader array of financial and
real assets, which can substitute for money (recall the discussion
above on the growing democratisation of financial markets).
Excess money could therefore drive up asset prices and depress
asset yields. The data on asset prices and yields offer strong
corroboration for this kind of effect being at work over the last
three to four years across the world.
The correction mechanism works as follows. In collectively
endeavouring to substitute out of money and into financial assets
(which looked increasingly attractive since the return of
confidence to markets sometime towards the end of 2003), asset
prices are driven up until such time as the expected return on
these (i.e., bonds, equity and other financial assets along with
real assets) no longer looks sufficiently attractive to money
holders for them to continue to seek to substitute out of money.
Therefore, endogenous movements in the yields on alternative
financial and real assets serve to restore equilibrium to money
holdings, although this happens without nominal money holdings
falling in the aggregate.
This story contrasts sharply with the conventional rationale (as
illustrated in Figure 3 above). This sees money as being purely
passive at all times. In this case, a reduction in the demand for
money, giving rise to an excess supply, sees equilibrium being re-
established with the demand schedule sliding along the infinitely
elastic supply schedule leading to an effortless reduction in the
money stock. This is the logical implication of approaches based
exclusively on demand for money function specifications.
However, it does not tell a plausible story in relation to the
effects coming from the cycle in uncertainty. A conventional
demand for money function is only one part of the story. It
cannot account for those periods when uncertainty dissipates
and individuals find themselves with much larger money hoardsQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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than they want to continue to hold. The required adjustment
process in such circumstances sees causality running from
money to financial asset prices.
The standard demand for money function (but augmented to
include a measure of uncertainty to illustrate our point), with
only bilateral substitution between money and bonds, is specified
as follows:
M
d = f (Y, E(R
b), UNCT)
where Y is the usual income scale variable and E(R
b)i st h e
expected opportunity cost of holding money. A reduction in
uncertainty leads to a reduction in the demand for money and,
assuming a closed economy, an excess supply of money. As
argued already, unlike in the case of an excess demand, there is
no automatic mechanism for absorbing the surplus. Individuals
wishing to restore equilibrium in their money holdings substitute
out of money and into bonds. This increases the price of bonds
and drives down their yields. This process continues until money
holders no longer see any expected gain to be had by
substituting further out of money and into bonds. They can,
therefore, be persuaded collectively to hold the existing nominal
money stock. The point that needs to be stressed here is that the
excess supply of money balances cannot be corrected by a fall
in the nominal money stock and equilibrium can only be restored
by changes in one or more of the arguments in the demand for
money function.
The increased level of participation of households in financial
markets may now mean that they will attempt to substitute out
of money and into a whole spectrum of financial assets rather
than just into bonds. The pattern of portfolio substitution
becomes multilateral rather than bilateral. A demand for money
function under these circumstances would look like the
following:
M






Where the new variables are respectively the expected yields on
equities, commodities, housing and derivatives. In such a money
demand specification the expected return on an array of financial
assets are potential reasons for substitution out of money.
Depending on the size of the money excess and the pattern of
substitution, most, or possibly all, asset prices could be affected,
as could the pace of activity and inflation. Inflation could respond
to direct substitution between money and goods and services or
indirectly via the effects of money substitution on asset valuation
and wealth (driving consumption) and the cost of capital (drivingQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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investment). Most, if not all, of the arguments in the demand for
money function adjust in ways that leave money holders content
to hold the unchanged nominal stock of money. But, as noted
already, this process of re-establishing equilibrium in money
holdings can be disruptive and potentially dangerous for financial
stability. It could drive asset prices into bubble territory with all
the adverse consequences of this for the allocation of resources
in the economy and for the economy itself when the bubble
bursts.
Conventional demand for money specifications (as depicted in
Figure 3) can lead to complacency in central banking circles.
This is because, in these formulations, the money stock adjusts
downwards completely and instantaneously, and in a completely
passive way without any deleterious consequences for the
economy, in response to a reduction in liquidity preference. Not
only are those who are attempting to reduce money balances
collectively failing to do so, but there will almost certainly be
others who, with the low (and continuing downward pressure
on) interest rates, will want to avail of the reduced cost of bank
loans to leverage themselves so as to avail of the improving
investment opportunities in financial markets. These will also be
adding to the boom conditions in these markets. This situation
has already been analysed above in our account of events
following the dissipation of uncertainty.
Evidence suggests that, in recent times, prices in most asset
classes have become very highly correlated. This is different from
five years ago when almost every asset class was uncorrelated
with equities. One possible hypothesis is that what is different
now is that these correlations are increasingly being driven by a
common factor, i.e., excess liquidity. Five years ago there was
nothing like the same amount of excess liquidity in the system as
there has been since then.
We have already seen an intensive search for yield, which has
spread to all financial assets. The recent and current high
correlation in the yields across a wide range of asset classes is
indicative of a common external cause, i.e., households and
corporates endeavouring to offload excess liquidity in a
prolonged and persistent search for yield. Apart from the dangers
for inflation, there is also the threat to financial stability. This is
because another major shock to the system would almost
certainly cause liquidity to dry up resulting, this time, in a
generalised asset price implosion. The irony is that, no matter
how much excess macro liquidity is outstanding, a major shock
will cause micro liquidity to evaporate suddenly. This must be a
concern in the light of past experience, which saw banking
systems being brought down by only partial asset price collapses.Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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7. What Can Money’s Counterparts Tell Us?
We divide events since the start of monetary union into three
time spans, which corresponds to different periods in the cycle of
confidence (these are summarised in Table 2). The first of these is
from the start of stage three of monetary union to March 2001.
This was a period of good economic performance in the euro
area. It was characterised by rapid credit growth. However,
strong capital outflows occurred as euro area non-financial
corporates endeavoured to buy into the US high-tech advances
(with NFA therefore making a negative contribution to M3
money growth). Investor confidence was also reflected in a
relative shift out of shorter-maturity financial assets (i.e., away
from those MFI liabilities which are included in the M3 money
stock) and into those longer-maturity higher-yielding MFI
liabilities not included in the money stock, i.e., NMDLs. Both of
these contributed negatively to money growth with the result
that money grew much more slowly than credit during this
period. These movements are displayed in the left-hand panels
of the stacked graphs in Chart 19.




March 2001 March 2001 - May 2004 May 2004 - August 2007
• Good economic • Heightened uncertainty • Returning confidence
performance
• High credit growth • Low credit growth • Reduction demand for
money
• Capital outflows (mostly • Capital inflows (foreign • Excess money (overhang)
M&As buying into US high investment positions only now (2004/2005)
tech) liquidated)
• Rapid growth of MFIs’ • Low growth of MFIs’ • Substitution out of money
long term financial NMDLs and into assets (asset price
liabilities (LTFLs) correlation)
• Moderate money growth • Rapid money demand • But continuing monetary
growth accommodation
• Accommodating monetary • Rapid credit growth
policy (deflation, financial (cheap leverage to take
instability, debt deflation) advantage of financial
market opportunities)
• Rapid growth in money • Continuing net capital
stock (but no risk to inflows (carry traders)
inflation)
• Rapid growth in MFIs’
NMDLs
• Asset price appreciation
and wealth effects (cost of
capital )
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A period of heightened uncertainty was triggered around March
of 2001 when there was a cluster of major shocks occurring in
a short space of time. It dented both consumer and producer
confidence and slowed bank loan growth (BL). This, according
to the above equation, should have slowed money growth in the
euro area, ceteris paribus (see middle panels of Chart 19). But
the opposite is observed — money growth accelerated instead.
This came from two sources: capital inflows as euro area
residents redeemed foreign investment positions and deposited
the funds in money market funds (MMFs) and bank deposits and
as they substituted away from the NMDLs of MFIs and towards
the shorter-maturity assets on banks balance sheets, which grew
rapidly in 2001 and 2002, and which are included in the M3
money stock. This reflects a fairly massive shift to the safe haven
store of value afforded by the shorter-maturity assets included in
the money stock. This is a perfectly understandable development
following the greater grass roots participation in financial markets
that occurred roughly over the previous two decades.
During this time period central banks (including the ECB)
deliberately maintained a fairly loose stance of monetary policy
inspired by worries about deflation, the ensuing possibility of a
debt deflation and possible financial instability. Endeavouring to
avoid what had happened to Japan in the 1990s presented a
very challenging environment for monetary policy at the time.
The rapid increase in the demand for money driven by
uncertainty and heightened risk aversion was met by a
corresponding increase in supply as central banks (including the
ECB) relaxed the stance of monetary policy substantially. The
upshot was rapid money growth during this period. The story
being told here is supported by the impressive inverse correlation
between money growth and the industrial confidence indicator
as noted already above. This rapid money growth does not
indicate an overhang according to the story being told here. This
is because, despite its rapid growth rate, it was being willingly
held and therefore not an immediate threat to inflation.
The third time span is that starting approximately in May 2004
and continuing up the present (at time of writing, June 2007). It
is one of returning confidence and a fall in the demand for
money. It was only about at this time that the monetary overhang
became a reality. It saw a gradual substitution out of money and
into a broad range of financial assets. But, as already argued
above, this did not succeed in reducing the money stock or its
growth rate since it is likely to have involved portfolio
substitution between members of the MH sector. Instead, the
continuing loose stance of monetary policy (still no doubt
inspired by deflationary concerns) began driving strong credit
growth as investors began to take advantage of good investment
opportunities in financial markets (amid rebounding confidence)Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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and cheap leverage and to provide the funding for a gradually
recovering euro area economy. Two of the three components of
the counterparts of the money stock in the equation above now
began to contribute positively to money growth: private sector
credit accelerated to quite rapid rates and there were continuing
rapid net capital. Money growth was brisk despite substitution
out of monetary liabilities and into banks’ NMDLs. It is still
debatable whether the ensuing asset price inflation and the
accompanying positive wealth effects, along with the reduced
cost of capital, will drive activity in the euro area economy
beyond capacity limits sparking an acceleration in inflation. Many
events in this recovery phase have yet to unfold.
8. Conclusions
Developments on the monetary side of the major advanced
economic regions of the world since the start of the new
millennium present a number of puzzles. To date, the economics
profession has not identified all of these puzzles or endeavoured
to link them together never mind offer a coherent story for their
resolution. This is what this paper sets out to consider. The
closest the debate has come to our concerns is in relation to
money demand and its undoubted instability in recent years
according to conventional specifications. These puzzles could be
seen as pieces of a jigsaw. Whether the pieces we have identified
fit together to make up a complete picture is not yet clear.
The crux of the argument here is based on the simple and
essentially Keynesian proposition that money becomes very
valuable as an asset to hold when people are beset by financial
anxieties. The core hypothesis in the paper is built on this and
the observation that the main reason why monetary dynamics
are now different to the past is because money’s attractiveness
as a store of value in bad states of nature has been significantly
enhanced by two generic developments that have occurred
since about the 1970s. The first of these is financial innovation
and liberalisation, which have triggered a vast democratisation of
financial markets as reflected in the growing household
involvement in these markets. The second development is that
policy measures related to the prudential regulation of banking
and developments in the banking industry itself, which has
bolstered substantially the soundness of bank deposits, and
accordingly the soundness of money, and therefore money’s
attractiveness as a store of value in adverse circumstances, but
only in adverse circumstances.
These developments have made financial assets increasingly
more attractive, and money increasingly less attractive, to hold in
good times and financial assets less attractive, and money more
attractive, to hold in bad times. Bank deposits vary from being
an asset which few want to hold in any great quantities in goodQuarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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time (i.e., most of the time), because of relatively poor yield, to
being an extremely valuable asset in bad times because of a
relative high yield. The period since the early 1970s has seen
trend holdings of financial assets increase substantially at the
expense of bank deposits but increasingly with this trend
disrupted by sharp increases in money growth when the
economy is faced with some financial threat.
The preference for liquidity in bad times leads to an escalation
in the demand for money. If this is not accommodated by
corresponding supply then the interest rate will be driven in the
wrong direction (i.e., upwards) relative to the conjunctural needs
of the economy (i.e., downwards). In the new financial market
and money landscape, the extent of liquidity preference is likely
to be substantial. The extent of the accommodation needed to
obviate an increase in interest rates (or to promote a reduction
in rates) is correspondingly large — hence the very rapid growth
in money in the euro area, in the US and indeed globally during
the period of widespread uncertainty in the early years of the
new millennium. Somewhat contrary to conventional wisdom,
this is not seen as representing a monetary overhang or
disequilibrium since all of the increase in the money stock was
being held voluntarily.
However, as soon as uncertainty begins to dissipate and the
demand for money falls, an overhang is likely to emerge. The
timing of the start of this new phase of growing confidence is
sometime around the end of 2003 or the beginning of 2004.
Endeavouring to offload excess money balances saw spillovers
into financial markets and fairly sharp increases across a range of
financial and real asset prices. An additional driver of money
growth in this current phase is loan growth, which begins to
accelerate as investors start to see the prospects of significant
gains from asset price appreciation. Loan growth begins to take
over from ‘portfolio shifts’ as a new driving force inflating
monetary aggregates. The new emerging generic determinant of
money growth is therefore the expected gross return on a range
of asset prices relative to the cost of leveraged funding for
market participants.
However, it remains a debatable point whether the asset price
inflation that has already occurred, and the accompanying
positive wealth effects, along with the reduced cost of capital,
will drive activity in the euro area economy, and indeed globally,
beyond the capabilities of the supply side of the economy to
deliver sparking an acceleration in inflation. It is too early to say
since many events in this recovery phase have yet to unfold.
However, there must be a concern that the effect of the
structural changes affecting banking and financial markets may
be having the effect of merely delaying the full impact of money,Quarterly Bulletin 4 2007
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credit and interest rate developments on activity and inflation
and not to undermine the long-run money-inflation relationship
which is probably the most well documented relationship in
economics and which has existed for centuries. In summary,
there is a risk that the traditional effects of rapid growth in money
and credit aggregates and low interest rates are merely being
postponed and will show up later in an acceleration in the pace
of economic activity which will not be matched by a
corresponding increase in the capacity of the economy to supply
goods and services and may therefore translate into
accelerating inflation.
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